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The notion of collecting "leading cases," Professor A.W. Brian
Simpson' informs the reader of this engaging and profoundly sub-
versive book, emerged in the nineteenth century as a handmaiden
to the ideal of legal science. The cases gave a method of learning
law not as a hodgepodge of precedents but as a coherent body of
principles. A few cases provided exceptionally clear applications of
the principles, and by concentrated study of these few the lawyer or
law student could learn "how to tease out the principles from the
cases, and how to apply them to the complex disputes which were
presented to courts in litigation" (p. 5). Dean C.C. Langdell of
Harvard put leading cases at the heart of his system of legal educa-
tion. Although the ideal of legal science that the "case method"
was supposed to inculcate has faded over the years, the method has
spread to every law school in America, and with it the (remarkably
durable) repertoire of famous cases that almost every student still
encounters in the first year of law study.
Earlier in his career a distinguished historian of legal doctrine,2
Simpson has more recently turned his formidable historiographical
talent to something completely different: digging into the back-
ground and context of famous legal disputes, strewing the shards
and fragments of his excavations 3 over the landscape, and reporting
his findings in extensive and meticulous detail. In this new mode he
has written book-length contextualizing studies of Regina v. Dudley
& Stephens, in which two British sailors were condemned to death
for eating their shipmates,4 and of the nasty practice of the British
government of detaining suspicious persons without trial during
World War II.5 Simpson's project in this book is to take on nine
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1. Charles F. & Edith J. Clyne Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
2. See, e.g., A.W.B. SniPSON, A IsToRY OF Ta COMMON LAw OF CONTRACT (1975);
A.W.B. SIMPsON, AN INTRODUCrION TO Tm HI TORY OF TmE LAND LAW (2d ed. 1986).
3. The archaeological metaphor is Simpson's own. See p. 12.
4. See A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALSM AND a COMMON LAW 247 (1984). The
sentence was almost immediately commuted to six months' imprisonment. See id.
5. See A.W. BRAN SIMPSON, IN TmE HIoEsT DEGREE ODIous: DETNTON WrrHOuT
TRIAL IN WARTIME BRAIN (1992).
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more of these English "leading cases," six from the nineteenth cen-
tury, two from the eighteenth, and one from the sixteenth,6 all still
studied in Anglo-American law schools, all landmarks of a formal-
ist legal science that he approaches in a decidedly antiformalist
spirit. Simpson starts with the legal records and ranges outward
from there, to the judges and lawyers, the litigants and their fami-
lies, the biographical, genealogical, political, social, economic, and
technological background of the dispute; then to the aftermath, the
actual consequences for the parties and society; and finally to the
part played by the case in the later history of legal dogmatics, the
process of its canonization as a "leading case." If there is a more
painstaking and ingenious researcher of local knowledge, a
shrewder and more avid excavator of miscellanies, than Brian
Simpson, I have never run across him: Simpson seems to have dug
up pretty nearly everything that seems even remotely relevant to
understanding his cases, and a great deal more besides. Indeed, so
overwhelming is the mass of contextual detail that the reader is res-
cued from psychic inundation only by the inherent fascination of
much of the background and Simpson's seductive charm as a story-
teller. This is a very funny book.7
Even so, the reader (this reader anyway) finds himself murmur-
ing a running commentary as the flood of detail rises higher and
higher - "fascinating... extraordinary... I had no idea... hilari-
ous... amazing... but what's the point?" Sometimes Simpson's
method looks like legal realism run amok, the piling up of inciden-
tal particulars, les faits pour les faits, context for context's sake. To
be sure, readers who have this reaction ought to reflect that this
irritable reaching for a "point" is a deformity of the legal mind,
which is absurdly impatient to find a rule or "holding" or practical
outcome for a client or a policy audience, incapable of keeping still
for a moment to smell the flowers or listen to a good yarn. There
doesn't have to be a "point" to a good narrative save that of setting
the scene, reconstructing the smell and feel of the situation as con-
temporaries lived it.
6. The cases Simpson addresses are: Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (1893), Regina v.
Keyn (1876), Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), 7pping v. S Helen's Smelting Co. (1865), Raffles v.
Wichelhaus (1864), Priestley v. Fowler (1837), Jee v. Audley (1787), Keeble v. Hickeringill
(1707), Shelley's Case (1581).
7. A tiny sample of its innumerable funny bits: "[1]n 1130, one Luilph de Audley pru-
dently murdered the local Saxon thane, and thereby established himself as the local poten-
tate." P. 80. "Following the Oxford college tradition of always violating trusts if at all
possible .... ." P. 86. "[I]n 1886 Gerard B. Fimch... extolled the virtues of the Langdellian
system [of case-law instruction], which he attempted to introduce into Britain. He had abso-
lutely no success; the sturdy individualism of English law students, or, if you like, their innate
idleness, made it impossible to introduce so authoritarian and disciplined a system." P. 161.
"[N]o human orifice was safe from the assaults of Victorian medical science .... " P. 275.
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Still, when legal writers go in for contextualization they usually
do want to make a point. Consider some of Simpson's fellow-
travelers in the thick-description game. There's a long legal-realist
tradition of "gap" studies, showing the difference between the "law
on the books" and the "law in action" by narrating what happens
before and after cases are decided. Some of these, like Richard
Danzig's studies of contract cases, dramatize what he calls the "ca-
pability problem"; that is, the limited capacities of appellate courts
to comprehend the real stakes at issue in a dispute and, above all, to
frame remedies that will effectively address the parties' interests.8
Realist legal historians like James Willard Hurst and Lawrence
Friedman have used similar methods to criticize the overvaluing of
appellate doctrine, to show that court decisions are usually a rela-
tively minor agent of the legal system compared to statutory and
executive action, and that legal causes and effects of all kinds are
often swamped by other social variables.9 Similarly but more em-
phatically, Gerald Rosenberg reconstructs the context of the Brown
decision' o invalidating racial segregation of Southern schooling to
argue the more general thesis that courts, even courts deciding
great cases, have little causal importance as motors of social
change." In a related tradition, writers unearth what "really" hap-
pened in a case to demonstrate the absurdity and irrelevance of the
doctrinal categories and analyses that judges employ.12 Other writ-
ers have the sharper political aim of revealing a dark subtext of
politics and power beneath the legal ideology of neutrality and the
rule of law. Simpson himself mentions probably the best-known ex-
ample, E.P. Thompson's history of the infamous Black Act of
1723,13 which Thompson exposed as a landed elite's new weapon in
the long struggle between gentry and commoners over use rights to
the forests. "Outsider" scholars, concerned with the ways in which
dominant legal discourses "silence" or "marginalize" subordinated
groups such as women and racial and ethnic minorities, have hoped
to find in contextualizing narratives or "storytelling" a means to re-
store suppressed perspectives, experiences, and normative longings
as participants in a dialogue on the legal system.14 Ironically, more
8. See RlcHARD DArzlo, ThE CAPABmrTY PROBLEM IN CONTRACr LAW (1978).
9. See, e.g., LAwRENcE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY oF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985);
JAMES Wi Hunsr, TBE GROWrH oF AMERICAN LAW. Th-E LAWMAKERS (1950).
10. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. See GERALD N. RosEmERa, TImE HoLLow HoPE 39-169 (1991).
12. See, eg., Tru~mAN W. ARNoLD, TiE Smois oF GOVERNMENT (1935); JEROME
FRANK, Cotmrs oN TiALz MYrH AND REALrTy IN AMERICAN JUSnCE (1949).
13. P. 9 (citing E.P. THOMPSON, WrnGS AND HUNTERS 250 (1st Am. ed. 1975)). The
Black Act enacted 50 new offenses carrying the death penalty.
14. See generally LAW'S STOaiES (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); Symposium,
Legal Storytelling, 87 MIC. L. REv. 2073 (1989).
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conservative legal writers have recently discovered the same con-
textualizing techniques as aids to their enterprise of demonstrating
the futility or counterproductive perversity of state interventions
into the autonomous normative orders of local communities or
markets15 and exposing the special-interest, "rent-seeking" political
motives behind legal measures nominally adopted in the general or
public interest.16 And finally, in its own unique niche, there is John
Noonan's powerful and moving, if not always entirely convincing,
use of stories about the lives of litigants in famous cases to remove
the veil of illusion, the "masks" of formal legal categories and pro-
cedures that cloud legal actors' ability to perceive the humanity of
the real persons whose disputes they must decide, and to help us
see them face to face.17
Simpson doesn't have a consistent agenda, like most of these
other writers, or any singular ax to grind. His are the Muses of
Complexity and Understatement, to whom it gives pain to point out
too explicit or too simple messages and morals. Still, he is out to
make, if not one point, then several points, as well as to tell some
good stories. I would roughly categorize the points as follows:
1. Antitheory, or the absurdity, reductive over-simplification, and
futility of legal science. Simpson's most consistent targets - the
people he thinks most in need of re-education (or, if that fails,
mockery) by historical contextualization - are the high theoretical
mandarins of the law: the Langdellian doctrinal scientists of the
nineteenth century, trying to reduce and rationalize the common
law into a system of abstract principles; and modem jurisprudential
thinkers like Ronald Dworkin and law-and-economics theorists like
Ronald Coase, essentially attempting the same thing.
Their special hubristic vice is ignorance of and disdain for messy
reality. Sometimes this vice is expressed as the "rigid application of
legal doctrine without regard to purpose or common sense" (p. 79),
as in the case of Jee v. Audley, in which a will was held to violate the
Rule against Perpetuities because a contingency might occur ' that
is, that a woman might bear a child, even though she was already
beyond childbearing age when the will was drawn, and in fact
known to have died without children when the will was interpreted.
This wholly insignificant case - whose report, as Simpson shows,
thoroughly mangled the facts it was supposed to be based on -
rose to fame when the legal scientist John Chipman Gray, trying in
the service of "economy of principles" to reduce the whole complex
law of perpetuities to a rule of thirty-two words and to make the
15. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELucsoN, ORDER WrroT LAW (1991).
16. See, eg., Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State:
The Story of Butter and Margarine 77 CAL. L. REv. 83 (1989).
17. See Jom. J. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MAsKs OF THE LAW (1976).
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rule exact and certain by applying it "remorselessly" and without
regard for its purposes, "however silly the result... needed a really
silly case to illustrate this" ' - hence, the elevation of Jee v. Audley
to a "leading case."
Raffles v. Wichelhaus, the famous case of the two ships Peerless
familiar to every contracts student, is another case that was quite
insignificant in its original context, promoted to leading-case status
because it supported a jurist's theory - or rather, many different
theories, for the case stood for something different for every theo-
rist who cited it.19 As nineteenth-century thinking about contract
became dominated by increasingly abstract theory as to how a con-
tract represents mutual agreement or a joinder of wills, the case
provided fodder for the jurists' argument over whether agreement
had to be actual or "objective," "a debate of considerable intellec-
tual interest but of virtually no practical importance" (p. 161).
Simpson's critique of law and economics is in a similar spirit:
"Quarrelling neighbours and common lawyers, engaged in the pro-
cess of dispute resolution at the margins of a largely traditional sys-
tem of property law, inhabit one world, which is real and very
untidy. Economists inhabit another world. Between them a gulf
seems to be fixed" (p. 194). The chapter that dramatizes the gulf
concerns the Victorian nuisance case, Tipping v. St. Helen's
Smelting Co. In that case, the House of Lords upheld - with many
vague qualifications - a landowner's suit for damages against a
neighboring copper-smelting operation that produced sulfuric acid,
rejecting the "public good" defense, which English courts had occa-
sionally adopted and which provided that the injury was privileged
if it furthered valuable economic interests. In this chapter, Simpson
actually begins not with the case but with a discussion of the ideas
of the welfare economist A.C. Pigou and Coase's extension and
criticism of Pigou's ideas in his famous article on The Problem of
Social Cost.20 In addition to reconstructing the background of
Tipping and other nineteenth-century industrial-use cases, Simpson
uses their complexity to criticize Coasean theory. Simpson offers
four points of critique. First, Simpson observes that Coase dislikes
"state intervention" as a solution to the problem of social cost, pre-
ferring contracts in markets. But when a factory pollutes a neigh-
bor, laissez faire is not an option; some authority, like the courts,
18. P. 97. Simpson adds, presciently, that with respect to the childbearing capacities of
older women, "the waters have been further muddied by the invention of the sperm bank."
P. 99.
19. The one thing it was never taken to stand for was the tiny pleading point it actually
decided: Once it appeared there was a latent ambiguity in the term Peerless in the contract,
the plaintiff's demurrer had to fail. The court never had to decide what would have hap-
pened had the buyer meant one ship and the seller another.
20. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cos4 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
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must decide one way or another (p. 168). Second, the legal alloca-
tion of property rights and liability rules in Victorian Britain was
extremely unclear because the legislature had left the copper indus-
try unregulated and common law courts, being understandably un-
able to resolve their general schizophrenia about whether to favor
the sacred rights of landowners or the interests of industrial devel-
opment, had arrived at contradictory answers. Among other effects
of this lack of clarity was to make litigation necessary to resolve
disputes over rights, which was prohibitively expensive for all but
the richest parties. Coase, says Simpson, gives no clue as to how his
theory would resolve these problems (p. 193). Third, attempts to
resolve disputes over conflicting uses by contract - for instance, by
one party's paying the other not to pollute, or for the privilege of
polluting - are often not practically possible and indeed failed in
this case, perhaps because Tipping was more interested in "devoting
himself to eccentric behaviour, litigation, and farming" (p. 191)
than in making deals with his neighbors (p.191). Finally, neither in
this situation nor in other similar ones could anyone have per-
formed the kind of cost-benefit analysis that Coasean theory seems
to call for - that is, estimating the costs to employment or to the
local economy of shutting down the works, or moving the smelter
or landowner, and so forth.2 '
I am predisposed to Simpson's general point of view in these
antitheory passages. But I can't help thinking he overdoes them.
Of course theorists ignore messy realities; but it's their reductive
simplicity that make the theories powerful. And sometimes very
influential, too: The weakest parts of Simpson's arguments, I think,
are those in which he suggests that real-world litigants, lawyers, and
judges simply go about their ordinary daily work uncontaminated
by the dreamy theorizings of High Boffins. Simpson's own work
provides many counterexamples, such as the reorganization of the
common law of contract in the nineteenth century around the pow-
erful simplifying conceptions of civilian treatise writers and juris-
prudes,2 and the influence of general conceptions of freedom and
fairness on nineteenth-century judges233 And only a very reckless
antitheorist would try to deny the influence of Chicago economists
such as Coase on legal policymakers and even on common law
judges - some of whom are legal economists themselves - in the
present time.
21. Pp. 193-94. This element of the critique echoes that of a powerful article of Mario .
Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HoF~SnRA L. REv. 641 (1980).
22. See A.W.B. Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, in LEGAL
THEORY AND LEGAL HIsTORY: ESSAYS ON TIM COMMON LAW 171 (1987).
23. See, for example, his treatment of the views of Bramwell. P. 215.
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Nonetheless, it's hard not to cheer Simpson's demolition jobs on
the more pretentious versions of legal science, all the more effective
because they are usually - the chapter on Coase is an exception -
so inexplicit and indirect. No one has ever drawn better than
Simpson the contrast between the confidence with which judges
and jurists assert the certainty, consistency, and uniformity of legal
principles and the determinacy of legal science, and the extreme
casualness in their manner of actual practice and decisionmaking -
in which law and facts are repeatedly miscited, and holdings trans-
ferred unthinkingly from one context to another and shamelessly
distorted in the transfer. No community of real scientists could be-
have quite like that - not consistently anyway. It's a confidence
that has to depend on a social setting in which nobody can contra-
dict you - nobody you care about, anyway.
2. The political subtext. Like many other thick-describers in the
Marxist, realist, and (more recently) conservative public-choice tra-
ditions, Simpson is sometimes concerned to "follow the money," or
winkle out other underground political influences on the decisions
- though unlike most of them he does not have any fixed views on
what these influences are likely to be in any particular case. In his
book on the Dudley & Stephens case, Cannibalism and the
Common Law, the main influence was the desire of the English
legal elite to avoid publicizing the embarrassing fact that sailors of
the world's most civilized society still adhered to customs justifying
their eating one another in cases of necessity, which led to the orgy
of hypocrisy involved in their trial and (initial) condemnation to
death. In the Highest Degree Odious is Simpson's most overtly po-
lemical work, an indignant exposure of the ugly, arbitrary realities
of Britain's system of wartime detention without trial and of the
ineffectual and hypocritical pretenses of judges to be upholding the
Rule of Law while not actually asserting much authority to try to
control the executive.
Leading Cases has fewer political subtexts than these other
books, but it does have some. The main examples here are chapter
2, discussing the rule in Shelley's Case, and chapter 9, discussing
Regina v. Keyn. The decision in Shelley's Case - another of those
cases, like lee v. Audley, lifted out of context to supply a rigid and
contrapurposive rule of interpretation, then perpetuated after its
repeal for no other motive than sadism in pedagogy (pp. 40-41) -
originally arose out of conflicting property claims of an uncle,
Richard, and nephew, Henry. The subtext here is religious politics:
Richard was a Catholic recusant, and from Simpson's story it ap-
pears quite likely that the judges' ultimate decision in favor of
Henry was rendered under pressure from Queen Elizabeth and her
Privy Council to punish Richard (pp. 29-31, 35). Regina v. Keyn, by
way of contrast, was overtly a case in which the judges upheld the
2050 [Vol. 95:2044
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ideal of the Rule of Law by refusing to yield to popular clamor to
convict the master of a German ship that negligently struck an
English ship and steamed away without picking up survivors (pp.
233-35). The courts ultimately decided they had no jurisdiction to
try Keyn (pp. 240-41). Simpson reports this case as one perhaps
partly influenced by extralegal pressures - considerations of diplo-
matic expediency and the desire for good relations with other mari-
time powers (p. 253). But ultimately the "politics" of Keyn was to
use the occasion to demonstrate the law's autonomy from politics
- "an expression of self-control under the pressure of powerful
emotions, and the triumph of the intellect over the passions which,
to the Victorian mind, represented the acme of civilization" (p.
254).
3. Expansion of the Frame. Finally, much of Simpson's work
here is in the spirit of Hurst, Friedman, and Rosenberg: It uses an
enlarged conception of legal history to try to expand the views of
lawyers and others about how legal systems work. Traditional law-
yers' and legal historians' work - including Simpson's in his prior
incarnation as a doctrinal historian - locating cases in a historical
chain of precedent and dogmatic reasoning implies that the legal
governance of society is a matter of applying the principles devel-
oped in previous cases to social facts. The social history of law
tends to demote cases, even leading cases, to bit players of rela-
tively minor and marginal roles. This is the message, or rather one
of the messages, of what I think are the two most interesting and
valuable chapters in the book.
Priestley v. Fowler is known as the origin point in English law for
the fellow-servant doctrine, that an employee may not hold his em-
ployer vicariously liable for another employee's negligence (p. 109).
When Simpson gets through expanding the frame to take in the
whole social-support system for injured servants at the time the
case was decided, Priestley looks entirely different. He describes a
world in which two traditional mechanisms for caring for sick and
wounded laborers were falling apart: the master's duty to support
his servant for the remainder of his one-year term of hire and the
poor law, the obligation of parishes to care for casual labor (pp.
113-27). Both were undergoing erosion, the first from the spread of
employment at will (p. 116), the second from "reforms" tightening
up on poor relief (pp. 123-25). The Priestley case was a freak, an
almost completely isolated instance of an employee's suing his
master, made possible here only because the plaintiff's father, a
substantial farmer, financed the suit that may eventually have bank-
rupted him (pp. 132-33). The case was also remarkable because
although it denied recovery to the plaintiff, it also "conceded, for
the first time, that there might be circumstances which entitled a
servant to sue his master for loss caused through an accident at
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work" (p. 108). The case "can be seen in retrospect as a first step
towards a world in which tort law became a candidate for the job of
replacing the older mechanisms of support" (p. 127).
Simpson reaps similar rewards from looking at Rylands v.
Fletcher from the perspective not simply of the history of tort doc-
trine, but of overall legal regulation of a particularly destructive
kind of happening: the bursting of reservoirs and consequent inun-
dation of the inhabitants below. In the history of tort doctrine,
Rylands appeared to many contemporaries, such as the young
Holmes, as an anomaly - a departure from what jurists liked to
think was the emerging general principle of no liability without
fault. Actually, as Simpson shows, the fault principle itself was con-
tested at the time, with many judges, including the notable
Bramwell (the Richard Epstein of his day), taking their stands for
strict liability, albeit strongly laced with contributory negligence
and assumption-of-risk defenses. But the actual case, like Priestley
v. Fowler, was a freak: Thomas Fletcher was the only plaintiff (and
a most undeserving plaintiff he seems to have been) who ever bene-
fited from the rule in the case. Why? The answer is that any reser-
voir of significant size and importance was regulated by the special
statutory acts setting up the companies (p. 219). After a major dam
disaster (the Holmfirth disaster of 1852), companies setting up
waterworks were required to compensate anyone who was hurt by
their failure (p. 206). The judges in Rylands were most probably
taking their cues from these statutory provisions (p. 218).
Sometimes Simpson cannot find much interesting to say about
the legal context of his cases, even by expanding the frame. When
that happens, he relates instead the history of a subject of which the
case might be said to be a part, a history that is more interesting
than the legal context. Thus, in the chapter on Keeble v.
Hickeringill (chapter 3) we are treated to a long excursus on "duck
decoys," which turn out to be enormous artificial pools of Dutch
invention built to attract ducks to hunters; in that on Raffles v.
Wichelhaus (chapter 6) to a discussion of speculation on cotton con-
tracts in Liverpool during the Civil War cotton shortage; and in that
on Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (chapter 10) to a minute de-
scription of the operations of the famous Smoke Ball and to a his-
tory of "quack" medicines generally, which were exceedingly
difficult to distinguish at the time from orthodox medical remedies.
These histories of incidental detail are often instructive and invaria-
bly amusing, even when they do not seem to have much to say
about law, except as further comment on the social unimportance
of many of the questions that chiefly agitate lawyers. Carbolic
Smoke Ball, for instance, attracted a formidable array of legal talent
and subsequent commentary (pp. 272-74), despite the fact that the
decision could have had almost no impact at all on sellers of quack
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cures, except those reckless enough to promise a reward if the cure
failed.
In a very interesting recent lecture, Simpson has divided the
world into "Legal Idealists" and "Legal Iconoclasts." 24 Legal ideal-
ism is an old dream, the dream that the ideal of the Rule of Law can
be achieved by means of a comprehensive and coherent science of
principles. But legal iconoclasm is just as old, the mocking and
trashing of the ideals of legal science as self-deceived and unattaina-
ble. In his lecture, Simpson criticizes both positions: Both, he says,
"make much the same serious mistake about the nature of ideals,
and much the same mistake about the relationship between human
conduct and the concept of rationality."25 The legal scientist thinks
there must be in principle a right answer to every legal question; the
trasher thinks that idea unattainable and hence futile. The idealist
is obviously wrong - for all the kinds of reasons spelled out at
length in Simpson's Leading Cases and other books: The law never
has had or could have that kind of determinacy and cohesion, and
those who claim it does and can may do so only by ignoring the
most evident facts of history and experience. But the iconoclast is
also wrong, because judicial decisions are not arbitrary or normless;
they follow conventions, often strong ones, usually conventions in-
fused by ideals. So both the "idealists" who think that law can
achieve a sort of scientific clarity and predictability and the "icono-
clasts" who think that it can't are engaged in venerable, but funda-
mentally pointless, argument.
This formulation of the conflict and Simpson's solution to it
seem a shade too complacent, as if Simpson were suggesting that
not much is at stake in whether the decisions of courts are silly or
sensible, close to the underlying facts in dispute or wholly remote
from them, consistent and uniform or wandering all over the lot -
because lawyers and judges, like other folks, muddle through
according to the conventions of their trade rather than trying to
achieve scientific rigor and because they will get things approxi-
mately right if their muddle is informed by a sort of striving toward
ideals, even inconsistent ideals.
But I think Simpson's own historical work betrays this rather
laid-back-Anglican attitude of mind. The ordinary realities of legal
systems as he describes their operations in his contextualizing
books such as Leading Cases are only occasionally what one could
call an amiable muddle; more often they are a much more unset-
tling muddle, a haphazard muddle of indifference, vanity, incompe-
tence, cruelty, ruling-class hypocrisy, and professional self-
deception. The lawyers and judges are not getting it approximately
24. A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Iconocasts and Legal Ideals, 58 U. GIN. L. RFv. 819 (1990).
25. Id. at 842.
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right, nor do they usually appear to be paddling in the approximate
direction of realizing ideals. The Simpson of these historical essays
is a social satirist with an old-fashioned radical sensibility. Under
the ironic flourishes and comic effects, the echoes of Trollope,
Wodehouse, and a touch of Monty Python, one catches a glimpse of
the moralist; when Simpson describes the lives of the poor, one
hears the voices of Dickens (in satirical rather than sentimental
mode), Balzac, and Orwell, and sometimes, when he describes the
attitudes of their social superiors, the savage irony of Swift. To be
sure, Simpson, though a critic, is no kind of nihilist; he believes in
common sense, honesty in dealing with facts, fair play, and sympa-
thy for the underdog. Law can never make the kind of sense the
High Boffins of the system want it to make. But law should make
sense, be true to facts, protect the weak from the powerful, and do
justice. Yet one does not emerge from Simpson's narratives, funny
and illuminating as they are, with much conviction that a whole lot
of justice is being done, except for those few who can afford it.
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